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THE MISSING WORD IN LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
RUTHANNROBSOP"
The missing word is not liberty. "Liberty" manifests itself in the Court's
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas' in a way that satisfies and delights those of us
who believe that the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 might yet
provide a basis for liberation, including sexual liberation. Justice Kennedy
begins his opinion for the Court by stating that "[1]iberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct."' The Court then notes that the Texas statute
criminalizing sodomy at issue in Lawrence "involves liberty of the person both
in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions."4  A liberty both
transcendent and intimate animates the Court's conclusion that the criminal
sodomy statute was unconstitutional.
The missing word is not privacy. The Court locates the precedential
genesis of the interpretation of the liberty clause to include sexuality in the
form of marital privacy as declared by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,5
quickly noting its equal applicability to unmarried persons.6  The Court
. Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. I would like to express my
appreciation to CUNY School of Law students Justin L. Haines and Katerina Semyonova for
research assistance and to S.E. Valentine.
I Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
4 Id.
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 The Court in Lawrence states that in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), it invalidated
a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, declaring that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated such an extension of Griswold
v. Connecticut. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477. The Court in Lawrence also noted that in
Eisenstadt the majority declared that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
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repeatedly emphasized that the statute in question was "touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home," 7 concluding that the "petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives."8
Indeed, "privacy" is subject to critique as being too prominent in the
Court's opinion. From the perspective of liberation, privacy relegates
sexuality to the home, the bedroom, and then into the closet. It protects
sexual expression only when it is secreted away from the public sphere.
Privacy does not safeguard "public displays of affection." Privacy does not
require civil rights. Privacy does not assist those without the economic
privilege to maintain a private space.
Privacy is also a troublesome concept when we consider the liberation
of those who experience violence within the home. For queer youth, this
possibility is especially pronounced. 9 Lesbians and gay men are subject to
intimate partner violence.'" Feminist legal theorists have long argued that a
man's home cannot be his castle if women are to be protected from male
violence." The private sphere sacrosanct from governmental interference
would preclude liberation for many.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
7 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
8 Id. at 2484.
9 As the Gay and Lesbian Task Force reports, the home is a site of frequent violence for
sexual minority youth:
One study of gay and lesbian youth found that 2 out of 5 had been physically
assaulted with more than three-fifths of the incidents having occurred in their
homes. According to Huckleberry House in San Francisco, a homeless shelter for
young people, gay and lesbian youth report a higher incidence of verbal and
physical abuse from parents and siblings than do their heterosexual peers.
NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, Information About Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered
and Questioning Youth, at http://www.nglff.org/issues/youthinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2003)
(citations omitted). The case of In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1982) provides but one
example. In Shane T., a New York family court judge adjudicated a fourteen year old boy as
abused by both his parents based upon his father's "unrelenting torrent of verbal abuse"
directed at the child's "sexual identity," specifically the father's taunts of "fag," "faggot," and"queer," despite the boy's denial of his homosexuality. Id. at 593. The family court judge
rejected the father's justification of a right to discipline his child for the boy's "girlie" behavior
and also found the mother at fault for failure to protect the child. Id. at 594. For further
discussion of family violence against sexual minority youth, see Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for
Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Youth, 1 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 429, 439-40 (1998); Scott Hershberger et al., Predictors of Suicide Attempts
Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth, 12J. OF ADOLESCENT RES. 477 (1997); Ruthann Robson,
Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who are Queer - Looking at Sexual Minority Rights from a
Different Perspective, 64 ALB. LAW REV. 915 (2001).
10 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law & Lesbian Legal
Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 - 91 (1990) (examining lesbian domestic violence).
I See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168, 190-94
(1989) (arguing that privacy theories are not sufficient to protect women from male violence);
Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 638 (1986).
THE MISSING WORD
The missing word is not lesbian. The word appears once in the Court's
opinion, once in O'Connor's concurring opinion and twice in Scalia's
dissenting opinion. However, in each of these instances the word "lesbian"
occurs in the context of a citation, and in each of these cases the word
"lesbian" is appended to "gay men." 12 Like the opinion and commentary to
Bowers v. Hardwick,"5 Lawrence v. Texas perpetuates the invisibility of lesbians
and the myth that there is no history of persecution against lesbians. 4
While a specifically lesbian history may be absent, the missing word is
not "history." History, unlike lesbian existence, preoccupies the Court. This
preoccupation occurs despite Scalia's complaint that the Court has
essentially weakened the history prong of the substantive due process test.
15
Despite Scalia's complaint, the Court does not explicitly criticize this
backward looking interpretation of rights, which essentially freezes human
rights to the America of 1776 in which African Americans, Native Americans,
and women were all less than human. Although the Court does ultimately
express an evolutionary perspective on rights' 6 they nevertheless seem
12 Justice Kennedy was discussing Romer v. Evans, which invalidated Amendment Two to the
Colorado state constitution, which had singled out persons who were "homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual." See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)). In
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor quotes from a Texas case stating that "[t]he statute brands
lesbians and gay men as criminals," to support her view that the Texas statute was "directed at
homosexuals as a class." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting State
v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 202-03 (Tex. App. 1992)). In Scalia's dissenting opinion, he
mentions the Ninth Circuit's opinion in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office as upholding "expanded investigations into backgrounds of gay and lesbian applicants for
secret and top-secret security clearance." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-71
(9th Cir. 1990)). Scalia also cites to the Gay/Lesbian Almanac, the work of renowned gay scholar
Jonathan Katz for the proposition that sodomy prosecutions occurred during the colonial
period. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing JONATHAN NED KATZ,
GAY/LEsBAN ALMANAc 29, 58, 663 (Harper & Row 1983)).
13 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For an analysis of the commentary to Bowers v. Hardwick and its
disregard of lesbian existence, see Ruthann Robson, Lifting Belly: Privacy, Sexuality & Lesbianism,
12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 177-203 (1990) (considering the constitutional doctrine of privacy and
its critiques as applicable to lesbians).
14 See Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-American History, 5 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990)
(discussing the history of lesbian sexual persecution).
15 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The test includes deciding whether
the carefully articulated claimed right is "deeply rooted" in this nation's "history and tradition"
and thus fundamental and thus deserving of heightened scrutiny. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
16 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. As the Court states:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
2004]
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compelled to reconsider the history of the sodomy laws and prosecutions. In
so doing, they adopt the version of history promulgated in the Historian's
Brief, as well as the briefs filed by the CATO Institute and the ACLU.17 The
Court reorients the historical inquiry to conclude that the "ancient roots" of
the prohibition against sodomy as discussed in Bowers v. Hardwick only began
to focus upon "same-sex couples" in the "last third of the 201h century." 8
Thus, the sodomy laws violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they demean the existence, and seek to control the
destiny of, the petitioners19 and presumably other gay men and lesbians.2"
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations
can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.
Id.
17 The Court states that "[a]t the outset, it should be noted that there is no longstanding
history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. at 2478. This sentiment echoes the amicus brief in support of Lawrence, written by
history professors, which argues that "the specification of 'homosexual sodomy' as a criminal
offense does not carry the pedigree of ages but is almost exclusively an invention of the recent
past." Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of History et al. at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter History Professors' Brief]. The amicus brief written in support
of Lawrence by the HRC contended that "it is a common misconception that gay people have
always been singled out and their sexual relations specially criminalized. In fact, it is only
relatively recently that sodomy has been proscribed solely between people of the same sex."
Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign et al. at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003) (No.02-102) [hereinafter HRC Brief].
Although Kennedy claimed not to "enter this [history of discrimination against
homosexuals] debate in the attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment," he shortly
thereafter highlighted several historical points drawn from the amici briefs and their sources
stating that they counseled "against adopting the definitive conclusions upon which Bowers
placed such reliance." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. First, Kennedy noted that 16th century
English sodomy laws and later 19th century American sodomy laws were understood to include
relations between men and women as well as between men and men, again adopting the
versions of history promulgated in some of the amici briefs. See History Professors' Brief, at 6
(The English courts interpreted this [the secular crime of buggery] to apply to sexual
intercourse between a man and woman as well as anal intercourse between two men); Brief of
Amici Curiae Cato Institute at 9, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102)
("American courts and commentators followed the English decisions defining the crime as
involving penetration by a male penis inside the rectum of an animal, a woman or girl, or
another man or a boy."). Kennedy then embraces the notion that the absence of homosexual-
specific legal prohibitions, as noted by some scholars, is in part due to the emergence of
homosexual as a distinct category not occurring until the late 1 9 century. See Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2478-79. This contention also appears in the briefs for the historians and the HRC. See
History Professors' Brief, at 2 ("Not until the end of the nineteenth century did lawmakers and
medical writing recognize sexual "inversion" or what we would today call homosexuality"); HRC
Brief, at 6 ("Although same-sex relationships have been documented throughout history, the
concept of homosexuality (or heterosexuality) as a defining characteristic of one's identity is
relatively recent... It was only in the late 19th century that American scientific literature began
describing homosexuality as a pathological 'condition,' something that was inherent in a
person, a part of his or her nature.").
18 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479.
19 See id. at 2484.
THE MISSING WORD
The missing word is not equality. The Court's reorientation of history
from that espoused in Bowers v. Hardwick to that of accepting a history of
discrimination against gay men (and lesbians) is an interrogation of the
unequal status of sexual minorities. Although the majority states that there
has been "no individual or societal reliance" on Bowers v. Hardwick 2 -a
claim that Scalia vigorously disputes22-the Court nevertheless highlights
links between (in)equality and the type of criminal sodomy statute upheld in
Hardwick. Moreover, the Court is obviously cognizant of the importance of
equality doctrine insofar as that line of thinking had assisted in eroding
Bowers v. Hardwick.
24
For Justice O'Connor, concurring, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause, should have
been the basis on which the Texas law was declared unconstitutional.
O'Connor, who joined the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, concluded
in Lawrence that "moral disapproval" of a group, rather than of an act, cannot
constitute a legitimate state interest under an equal protection analysis.2
5
While O'Connor and the Court fall far short of declaring sexual minorities
absolutely equal to heterosexuals-reserving as they each do specific
instances in which inequality should be constitutionally permissible 26 -
20 Assuming that they are not minors, are not being injured or coerced or "situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused," or that the conduct is not public or
commercial. Id.
21 Id. at 2483.
22 See id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What a massive disruption of the current social
order" the "overruling of Bowers entails.").
23 In Lawrence, the Court states:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is
made criminal and the law, which does so remains unexamined for its substantive
validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal
protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
24 Justice Kennedy relies upon his previous opinion in Romer as one of the two cases
subsequent to Bowers which "cast its holding into even more doubt." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-
82. The other case was Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) in
which the Court reaffirmed protection for abortion within the liberty clause of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
25 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486, 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26 O'Connor states that there are legitimate interests that would allow distinctions between
2004]
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equality as a concept and doctrine is certainly not missing from the Court's
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.
Equality and Liberty. Privacy and History. Even a few references to
"Lesbian." What could be missing? The missing word, the word I longed to
read, longed to hear addressed, longed for like a lost lover, friend or child,
was, an apology. Something like "sorry" or a mention of "remorse."
Repentance has a rather religious overtone, but I think that would have been
more palatable than silence.
The Court stated that, "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and
it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled." 27 For some, this may have read as
an apology. It may be an admittance of error, but it was not the apology that
sexual minorities deserve. We deserve an apology for the seventeen years of
grief, pain, and death caused by Bowers v. Hardwick, which the Court now
admits has always been wrong.
Michael Hardwick, the original plaintiff in Bowers v. Hardwick, certainly
deserves an apology. In 1982, Michael Hardwick was a 28-year-old white gay
man working in a gay bar in Atlanta. The animosity of one particular police
officer led Michael Hardwick to become a plaintiff in a civil rights action
challenging Georgia's sodomy statute." After prevailing in the Eleventh
"heterosexuals and homosexuals... such as national security or preserving the traditional
institution of marriage." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor,j., concurring). The opinion
of the Court is less definite, only making it clear that the case "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter." Id. at 2484.
27 Id.
28 One morning after work, Hardwick left the bar with a beer in his hand. He was stopped
by a police officer and had to sit in the back of the officer's car for twenty minutes, after which
the officer finally issued a ticket for drinking in public. When Hardwick did not appear for the
hearing, probably because of an error of the hearing date on the ticket, that same police officer
came to Hardwick's home with an arrest warrant. Hardwick was not home. When Hardwick's
roommate told him later that a police officer had been there, Hardwick went to the county
clerk. He told the clerk that a police officer had already been to his house with an arrest
warrant. The clerk said that was impossible, because it usually takes at least forty-eight hours to
process a warrant. Apparently, Officer Torrick had personally processed the warrant, the first
time he had done this in ten years. Michael Hardwick paid a $50 fine for drinking in public.
He thought everything was settled. About three weeks later, Officer Torrick came to Michael
Hardwick's house with the arrest warrant. The front door to the house was open. Officer
Torrick stood by the door to Michael Hardwick's bedroom and watched him having oral sex
with another man. Officer Torrick then entered the bedroom and arrested Michael Hardwick
[Vol. 10:397
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Circuit, Michael Hardwick found himself in the United States Supreme
Court. One can only imagine what it was like for Hardwick to read the
Court's insulting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.9 Would Hardwick not have
died five years later had the result in the case been different?
Robin Shahar also deserves an apology from the United States Supreme
Court. Not content with his victory in Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Bowers,
the Attorney General of Georgia, believed it was important that no potential
sodomites were in his employ. Thus, he revoked the offer of employment to
Robin Shahar as "necessary in light of information.., relating to a
purported marriage between [Ms. Shahar] and another woman."3 ° The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Michael Bowers' role in Bowers v.
Hardwick gave him a special concern about Shahar's suitability as an
employee because he could reasonably view her as creating controversy
within the Attorney General's Office. 1
and his companion for violating Georgia's sex statute. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR
CONVICTIONS 381403 (Penguin 1988); Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir.
1985).
29 The Court ruled that Hardwick's claim that "homosexual sodomy" is protected by federal
constitutional privacy is "at best, facetious." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. Moni Basu pondered
Hardwick's fate:
Today, Hardwick's family wonders whether his life might have been different had
the Court ruled in his favor seventeen years ago. Perhaps he would not have
become a virtual recluse who was found dying of AIDS in his South Beach studio...
[Hardwick's nephew] Weston said the Supreme Court ruling haunted his uncle
until his death [in 1991]. 'The ruling was devastating for all gay people, but it was
especially so for him,' he said. 'It called into question everything he had been
about.'
Moni Basu, Georgia Activist's Family Celebrates Gay Sex Ruling, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, June 29, 2003 at, Al. There is also a persuasive argument for the connection
between the AIDS epidemic and sodomy laws:
First, sodomy laws create and reinforce internalized homophobia among certain gay
men. Secondly, sodomy laws prevent the dissemination of safe-sex materials.
Thirdly, sodomy laws interfere with data collection and distort medical research.
Fourthly, sodomy laws discourage gay men from reporting venereal disease to their
doctors and public healthauthorities.
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 121 n.118 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
30 Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting letter from Michael
Bowers to Robin Shahar).
31 See id. at 1105. The Eleventh Circuit stated:
As both parties acknowledge, this case arises against the backdrop of an ongoing
controversy in Georgia about homosexual sodomy, homosexual marriages, and
other related issues, including a sodomy prosecution-in which the Attorney
General's staff was engaged-resulting in the well-known Supreme Court decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick. When the Attorney General viewed Shahar's decision to
"wed" openly-complete with changing her name-another woman (in a large
2004] 403
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Bowers v. Hardwick empowered many people other than Michael Bowers
to discriminate. Although the Constitutional basis of Bowers is the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, some courts imported the
Supreme Court's decision into the equal protection analysis.3 2 Further, even
when Bowers was correctly limited, it could operate to uphold employment
discrimination as when Teyonda Walls, an administrator with a community
diversion program in Virginia, refused to answer Question 40 of a new
background check asking, "[h]ave you ever had sexual relations with a
person of the same sex?"33 The Fourth Circuit declared that the "relevance
of this type of question to Walls' employment is uncertain, but because the
Bowers decision is controlling, we hold that Question 40 does not ask for
information that Walls had a right to keep private," and upheld Walls'
termination from her employment.
4
In addition to losing employment because of the Court's mistake in
Bowers v. Hardwick, lesbians and gay men lost their children. In the notorious
case of Sharon Bottoms, the Virginia courts disregarded the presumption in
favor of a "natural parent" to award custody of Ms. Bottom's toddler to her
mother, the child's maternal grandmother, because Ms. Bottoms was
"sharing her bedroom and her bed" with her female lover. 5 The trial judge
concluded that Sharon Bottoms' conduct was illegal and was a "felony in the
state of Virginia," therefore rendering Ms. Bottoms an "unfit parent."36 The
"wedding") against this background of ongoing controversy, he saw her acts as
having a realistic likelihood to affect her (and, therefore, the Department's)
credibility, to interfere with the Department's ability to handle certain kinds of
controversial matters (such as claims to same-sex marriage licenses, homosexual
parental rights, employee benefits, insurance coverage of "domestic partners"), to
interfere with the Department's efforts to enforce Georgia's laws against
homosexual sodomy, and to create other difficulties within the Department which
would be likely to harm the public perception of the Department.
Id. at 1104-05. The court then concluded that the Attorney General's "worries and view of the
circumstances that led him to take adverse action against Shahar" could not be said to be
"beyond the broad range of reasonable assessments of the facts." Id. at 1106.
32 See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton School Dist., 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Bowers
as authority for the proposition that homosexuals as a class are afforded minimal scrutiny in
sexual harassment cases); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reasoning that an
argument that "practicing homosexuals" deserve suspect class status even though the argument
would not stand even though it was not foreclosed by the holding in Bowers). But see High Tech
Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting contention
that Bowers determines the level of equal protection scrutiny).
33 Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1990).
34 Id. at 193. Walls had refused to answer several other questions and the court similarly
held that Ms. Walls had no right not to answer the questions.
35 SeeBottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Va. 1995).
36 Trial Transcript, In re Doustou, No. CH93JA0517-00 (Cir. Ct. of Cty. of Hendrico, Va.
404 [Vol. 10:397
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trial court's award of custody to the child's grandmother was upheld by the
Virginia's highest court.
37
Not content to affirm a denial of custody and further restrict visitation
to a lesbian mother, a justice on South Dakota's Supreme Court concurred
specifically to emphasize the state's sodomy statute and declare that
"homosexuals" such as the lesbian mother in question were "committing
felonies, by their acts against nature and God."38 The Alabama Supreme
Court likewise did not hesitate to use its state sodomy law to support its
conclusions that lesbians should be deprived custody of their children. In Ex
Parte D. W W, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld restricted visitation and a
denial of custody to a lesbian mother, citing the Alabama "deviate sexual
intercourse" statute to conclude that "the conduct inherent in lesbianism is
illegal in Alabama," and thus the mother "is continually engaging in conduct
that violates the criminal law of this state."39 The court continued by holding
that "[e]xposing her children to such a lifestyle, one that is illegal under the
laws of this state and immoral in the eyes of most of its citizens, could greatly
traumatize them."4" Citing D.WW, in the case of Ex PartejM.F., the court
changed custody from the mother to the remarried father because the
mother had "chosen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle" that was
illegal under Alabama law.4 In Ex Parte H.H., although the opinion for the
court merely mentioned the mother's "homosexual relationship" in
reversing her grant of custody, Chief Justice Moore's concurring opinion
expounded at length on the sodomy laws of Alabama (and other states)
which supported his conclusion that "[hlomosexual conduct is, and has
been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature,
and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God upon which this
Nation and our laws are predicated."
42
Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with author).
37 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108-09.
38 Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
39 Ex Parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a) (3)
(1975)).
40 Id.
41 Ex ParteJ.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 n.5 (Ala. 1998) (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65
(1975), the state statute prohibiting "deviate sexual intercourse").
42 Ex Pare H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring). Moore was
elected to the Alabama Supreme Court with the campaign promise to "restore the moral
foundation of the law" and soon thereafter achieved notoriety for installing a 5,280-pound
monument depicting the Ten Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial
Building. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003). After federal courts
found that the monument violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, Glassroth
v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2002), affd, Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282,
1284 (11th Cir. 2003), ChiefJustice Moore was ordered to remove the monument. See Glassroth
v. Moore, No. 01-T-1268-N, 2003 LEXIS 13907 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2003). After the deadline to
remove the monument passed, ChiefJustice Moore was suspended, with pay, pending resolution
2004]
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Sharon Bottoms, the lesbians in the above custody cases known to us
only by their initials, as well as countless women and men who feared to
litigate because of the reverberations from Bowers all deserve an apology from
the United States Supreme Court. Those who were convicted under the
various forms of the sodomy statutes deemed constitutional in Bowers also
deserve an apology. James Williams, convicted of solicitation of sodomy-a
crime which is dependent upon the criminalization of sodomy43-was
required as a condition of his probation to "wear a placard stating 'BEWARE
HIGH CRIME AREA' while walking through the area where he committed
his offense."44 In 1999, Daryl Bullock, who testified that he called himself
"Lady Denise," was sentenced to thirty months of hard labor for solicitation
involving an undercover officer of a "crime against nature."45 In another
instance involving an undercover police officer and a conviction for
soliciting a crime against nature, Dandre Moore was ultimately sentenced to
ten years of hard labor, a sentence upheld on appeal in 2001.46 These
people,47 including men convicted of heterosexual sodomy,4" suffered
of an ethics complaint, which charged that he failed to "observe high standards of conduct" and
"respect and comply with the law." Jeffrey Gettleman, Judge Suspended for Defying Court on Ten
Commandments, N.Y. TIMES, August 23, 2003, at A7.
43 For example, in People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62, 62-63 (N.Y. 1983), the New York Court
of Appeals held that a statute which prohibited loitering "in a public place for the purpose of
engaging, or soliciting another person to engage, in deviate sexual intercourse or other sexual
behavior of a deviate nature" must be viewed as a "companion statute to the consensual sodomy
statute." The court reasoned that because they had previously declared that the underlying
sodomy statute that criminalized acts of deviate sexual intercourse between consenting adults
unconstitutional, and because the "object of the loitering statute is to punish conduct
anticipatory to the act of consensual sodomy," there was "no basis upon which the State may
continue to punish the loitering or solicitation." Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d at 62 (citing People v.
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980)).
44 See Williams v. State, 505 S.E.2d 816 (Ct. App. Ga. 1998) (vacating "creative" sentencing
and remanding case for resentencing).
45 See State v. Bullock, 767 So. 2d 124, 126 (La. App. 2000). Bullock was arrested by an
undercover police officer who testified that both oral sex and the amount of $20 were discussed.
See id. at 126.
46 See State v. Moore, 797 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 2001). One can only hope his attorneys are
pursuing a writ of habeas corpus after the decision in Lawrence.
47 See, e.g., Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996) (convicting defendant of
solicitation of sodomy in a sting operation where officers patrolled a highway rest area and
approached men to see if they would express an interest in sexual activity); State v. Walsh, 713
S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (convicting defendant of sexual misconduct for touching an undercover
police officer's penis and equal protection arguments rejected because prohibiting
homosexuality was rationally related to public health goals); Sawatzky v. City of Oklahoma, 906
P.2d 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (convicting defendant for soliciting an act of non-commercial
sodomy from a police officer of the same gender).
48 See, e.g., State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1995) (convicting two male defendants of
committing abominable and detestable crimes against nature when they had oral sex with two
female exotic dancers, with the court noted that an unmarried heterosexual adult does not have
a privacy right to engage in unnatural acts); United States v. Allison, 56 M.J. 606 (C.G. Ct. Crim.
App. 2001) (sentencing a Coast Guard member to eleven months of confinement and
subsequent discharge for videotaping consensual oral sex with his female partner in his home).
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because the United States Supreme Court was "wrong."
Measured against those who lost their lives, their children, and their
freedom, an appeal for apology on behalf of all those who merely had to
read the hateful words of the United States Supreme Court might seem
trivial. Yet, for seventeen years, law students-lesbian, gay, bisexual,
heterosexual, transgendered, and questioning-have been forced to read the
words of a majority of the United States Supreme Court as they reinterpret a
claim of privacy as a claim of "homosexual sodomy" and then reject that
claim as "at best, facetious."49  While at the same time reading Burger's
concurring opinion, citing the Bible and declaring that to "hold that the act
of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."5" Adding insult to injury is
Powell's concurrence in Bowers, which minimized the importance of the lives
of sexual minorities, 51 and, as some casebook authors argue, was a decision
later regretted by Justice Powell who had thought that Bowers v. Hardwick was
not really an important decision.
52
Students typically used to read excerpts from Bowers v. Hardwick several
times during their legal education. The case is properly found in
constitutional law, family law, criminal law, and sexuality and the law
casebooks. 3 For sexual minority students, each time they read the case it
provoked a range of emotions including rage, fear, sadness, incredulity,
outrage, and hopelessness. Perhaps the most common reaction I heard
expressed was disrespect for the Court, the law, and their future profession,
often to the point of questioning whether they still desired a career in law.
All of these students have earned an apology from the United States
49 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
50 Id. at 197 (BurgerJ., concurring).
51 See id. at 197 (Powell,J., concurring).
52 See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (4th ed. 1999) ("retired
Justice Powell stated that 'he probably made a mistake' in his vote"); PAUL BREST ET AL.,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1258 (4th ed. 2000)
(discussing Justice Powell's regret at the switch in his vote and his explanation that he'd never
met a homosexual); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 50-58
(2d ed. 2002) (stating in the notes to Bowers v. Hardwick that "Justice Powell publicly questioned
his Bowers vote as early as 1990").
53 See, e.g., AREEN, supra note 52, at 263-266; DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 572-578 (3d ed. 2003); BREST, supra
note 52, at 1243-1253; SANFORD KADISH & STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 158-161 (7th ed. 2001); KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD




It is not only sexual minority students who deserve an apology. It is all
students who enter their legal education possessing some idea of fairness and
justice, however vague or in some cases subordinated to other interests, and
who then discovered the United States Supreme Court's cramped and
dishonest version ofjustice in Bowers v. Hardwick.
And it is not only law students that deserve an apology. As law
professors, many of us stood before our students and taught a case that
declared that any state could constitutionally criminalize our sexual
expression. Certainly, each sexual minority professor who taught Bowers v.
Hardwick, like all professors, developed a strategy for teaching the case. But,
I daresay it was never pleasant.
There are, of course, many unpleasant cases and to my knowledge, no
court has ever apologized. The Court in Brown v. Board of Education54 did not
say it is sorry for the travesty of Plessey v. Ferguson's55 constitutionalization of
racial segregation. The Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical,56 finally putting
Lochner v. New York " to rest, did not apologize to the workers of the United
States.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court is an institution, it is
comprised of individuals. Of the justices who composed the majority in
Bowers v. Hardwick and participated in Lawrence v. Texas, neither joined the
opinion overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.58 Perhaps it is asking too much for
the members of the Court in the majority to apologize for mistakes that they
themselves did not make. Isn't it enough that the Court acknowledges that
they were wrong and correct the mistake?
54 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
56 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
57 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58 Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion, which would have found the
Texas statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined
the dissenting opinion ofJustice Scalia.
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Yet it is important to remember that the reason Lawrence v. Texas is
such a victory is that Bowers v. Hardwick was such a disaster.5 9 A disaster of
this scope produced by the United States Supreme Court merits more than
mere correction. The Court should account for the blood and tears of an
uncountable number of persons. An apology would be a beginning.
59 For further discussion, see Mary Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by the Law in the
1990s USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1 (1994); see
also Leslie, supra note 29.
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